You’re Spending Too Much on Security Tools. Here’s the Part a Packet Broker Can Fix.

Two bars comparing what a security tool is fed, including duplicate and unused traffic, with what it needs after a packet broker

Here is a renewal many teams will recognize. It is an illustration, not a customer story. The core moves from 40G to 100G. The upgrade was for headroom, and the traffic itself has barely changed. A few weeks later, the quote for the NDR and IDS sensors comes back larger anyway. The sensors need 100G interfaces to connect to the new links, the next appliance class to carry them, and in some cases a licence tied to the speed of the port. Nothing about what the tools inspect is different. The quote followed the pipe.

That is one of two ways network security tools end up costing more than they should. Some costs follow the connection: the speed of the port, the class of the appliance, the number of links that each need a sensor. Others follow the volume: throughput licences, SIEM ingest, capture storage. Much of that volume is traffic the tool does not need: duplicate packets, flows no rule will ever match, payload a metadata tool never reads.

A packet broker works on both. It sits between the network and the tools, so a tool no longer has to match the link it monitors, and it removes unneeded traffic before it reaches the meter. If the goal is to reduce security tool costs, a packet broker is one of the few options that changes what is being measured instead of the unit price.

This post covers where the money goes, which part a broker can cut, which part it cannot, and how to cut without creating a blind spot.

First, what a packet broker won’t fix

A packet broker changes what packet-consuming tools receive and where they receive it. That is all it does, and it is a smaller slice of the security budget than the headline suggests.

It does nothing for endpoint, identity, email or SaaS security spend. An IBM Institute for Business Value study with Palo Alto Networks, a platform vendor with an interest in the answer, found organizations running an average of 83 security solutions from 29 vendors. Only a handful of those sit on a TAP or a SPAN port.

For a SIEM, a broker reduces only the network-derived share of ingest. In many organizations that share is small next to endpoint, cloud and identity logs. For those logs, the SIEM’s own lower-cost storage tiers (Microsoft Sentinel’s data lake tier, for example) or a log pipeline in front of the SIEM are the better lever.

A broker also rarely pays back for a single tool on low-speed links. In public cloud, the traffic mirroring is often the cost in its own right.

If most of your spend sits in those places, this post is not your answer.

How network security tools charge you

The tools that do sit on the network are charged for in two broad ways. Some costs follow the connection and some follow the volume. The difference matters more than the price, because it decides which changes lower the bill at all.

What is meteredFollowsTypical toolsWhat pushes it up
Port speed of the probe connectionThe connectionSome NDR productsLink speed, whatever the load
Appliance capacity and countThe connectionInline IPS, DLP, packet capture, NPM probesInterface speed, peak load, number of monitored links
Sensor throughput (Gbps)The volumeNDR, IDSTraffic delivered to the sensor
Ingest volume (GB per day)The volumeSIEMEvery event and flow record forwarded
RetentionThe volumePacket capture storageCaptured volume multiplied by days kept

A link upgrade with flat traffic leaves the volume rows alone. It hits the connection rows, which is what happened in the opening example.

Sensor throughput. Corelight is a useful worked example because its terms are public. As of November 2026, Corelight’s product-specific terms measure sensor throughput in Gbps on a five-minute average, calculated after the sensor’s own input filtering. That detail changes where a broker helps. Traffic the sensor filters out is already uncounted, so filtering upstream that the sensor could have done itself saves nothing on the licence. The saving on a meter like this comes from what the sensor no longer has to receive at all: fewer duplicate packets reaching Corelight, sensor hardware sized to the filtered feed, and fewer sensors for the same links. On a throughput meter, a faster link changes nothing until the traffic grows. Other NDR products license by the port speed of the probe connection, so there a faster link means a bigger licence whether or not the traffic grew.

Ingest volume. As of November 2026, Microsoft Sentinel bills its analytics tier per gigabyte ingested, with commitment tiers from 100 to 50,000 GB per day. For network-derived data, the way to reduce Microsoft Sentinel ingestion costs is to send fewer and leaner records. Splunk is less direct. It offers several pricing models, including ingest pricing in GB per day and workload pricing based on compute. On a workload model, cutting ingest lowers the bill less directly, so check which meter your contract uses before expecting your Splunk licence cost for network data to fall.

The hidden ones. Some costs never appear as a line item: a tool port for every monitored link, a tool refresh forced by a link upgrade, and analyst hours spent closing the same alert twice. Retention is a cost driver too, but storage arithmetic is a subject for another post.

One technical point most budget holders miss: a tapped full-duplex link produces a separate monitoring stream for each direction. A 100G link can therefore present up to 200 Gbps of monitor traffic at peak. Tools are sized to that peak, not to the link’s average.

Six levers, matched to the cost they cut

A broker is not one feature. It is a set of techniques, and each one maps to a specific cost driver. Two of them separate the tool from the link, three trim the feed, and one removes repeated work. Our Keysight overview shows where the broker layer sits in a visibility architecture. The same applies for our other network visibility partners.

Before and after: network links wired directly to every security tool, compared with TAPs feeding a packet broker that delivers filtered feeds to right-sized tools

Illustrative. Thick lines are full, unfiltered traffic; thin lines are filtered, deduplicated feeds.

LeverWorks onCost driver it cutsWhat it saves
Aggregation and speed conversionThe connectionTool ports, sensor count, port-speed licencesSensors per link, refreshes forced by link upgrades
Load balancingThe connectionAppliance classThe step up to the next model
Per-tool filteringThe volumeThroughput tier, appliance countCapacity spent on traffic the tool cannot use
DeduplicationThe volumeThroughput, duplicate ingestLicence headroom and analyst time
Packet slicing and header strippingThe volumeThroughput, storageBytes a header-only tool never reads
Do it once, feed manyRepeated workPer-tool processingDecryption and metadata work done in every tool
  1. Aggregation and speed conversion. Many lightly used links are combined onto fewer tool ports, so one sensor covers links that would each have needed their own. A 100G link can also be delivered to a 10G tool, once the feed has been filtered to fit. Aggregation does not shrink a throughput licence, because the total traffic is the same. It cuts the number of sensors and ports, and it stops the tool having to match the link.
  2. Load balancing. One large stream is spread across several smaller tools with N+1 failover, in place of one larger appliance.
  3. Per-tool filtering. Each tool gets only the traffic its job needs. Backup and storage replication, for example, can be kept away from an IDS that has no rules for them.
  4. Deduplication. SPAN ports, and capturing the same packet at more than one point, both create copies. We covered the mechanics in Resolving the Challenge of Duplicate Packets. Removing copies cuts throughput, duplicate events in the SIEM, and duplicate alerts.
  5. Packet slicing and header stripping. Slicing truncates the payload for tools that only read headers. Stripping removes tunnel and VLAN encapsulation so tools can parse what is inside.
  6. Do it once, feed many. Decryption, metadata or IPFIX generation, and timestamping happen once at the broker and not inside every tool. Our post on Encrypted Client Hello makes the metadata argument in full.

How much any of this saves varies widely from one network to the next. The figures in circulation come from vendors and most are years old. The only number worth putting in a business case is one you have measured.

Where each lever quietly removes evidence

Every technique that removes traffic can also remove evidence. “Without reducing visibility” is a design discipline, not a feature. This is where a cost project goes wrong, usually without anyone noticing until an investigation needs the packets that were never delivered.

  • Filtering. “Known-good” traffic is a favourite exfiltration path, precisely because nobody inspects it. Filter per tool against a written purpose, never globally, and review the filters whenever the network changes.
  • Deduplication. A window set too wide can remove legitimate retransmissions, which performance tools need to see. Security and performance tools may need different settings on the same broker.
  • Slicing. It removes the payload that signature-based IDS rules and file extraction depend on. Never slice the feed to a tool that inspects payload.
  • Header stripping. It can remove the VLAN or tunnel context an analyst needs to attribute an event to a tenant, site or segment. Preserve that context or re-tag it.
  • Load balancing. Both directions of a session must land on the same tool, which means symmetric hashing. Without it, stateful detection breaks. Check what happens to sessions when a tool fails over.
  • Speed conversion. If the filtered traffic bursts past the delivery port, the broker drops the excess, and unless someone is watching its counters, nobody is told. Size to peak and alarm on broker egress drops.
  • Sampling. Never for security tools. A sampled feed is a blind spot with a schedule.

Prove nothing was lost

A cheaper design is only better if it sees what the old one saw. That has to be measured before and after, not asserted.

  • Baseline first. For each tool, record what it receives today: volume, the share that is duplicate, and the drop counters on the tool and on any SPAN port feeding it.
  • Compare after the change. Check broker egress drops and tool drops, then compare alert and detection volumes over a matching period. A fall in duplicate alerts is expected. A fall in distinct detections needs an explanation.
  • Draw the coverage map. List which links each tool sees, before and after. A link that disappears from the map should be a decision, not an accident.
  • Re-run attack simulation. Replay the same simulated attacks against the new design and confirm the same detections fire. Our post on Keysight Threat Simulator shows what that looks like in practice.

Time it to the renewal

The cheapest moment to resize a tool is before its renewal or before the link upgrade, not after. Once the larger licence is signed, the saving waits for the next term.

Start measuring 90 to 180 days ahead. That leaves time to baseline each feed, test the filters and deduplication settings, prove coverage, and carry a right-sized number into the negotiation while it can still change the quote. The same holds for a planned link upgrade: design the tool feeds first, so the upgrade does not drag every tool up with it.

Five questions for your next renewal

What licence metric does each of your network security tools use?

Port speed, throughput, appliance count or ingest. Some follow the connection and some follow the volume, and each responds to a different lever.

What share of the traffic each tool receives is duplicate, and how do you know?

An estimate is not an answer. A counter is.

Which tools receive traffic they have no rule, model or use for?

That traffic is being paid for and ignored.

When your links next get faster, which tools are contractually forced to follow?

Port-speed licences and fixed-capacity appliances are the usual suspects.

Could you show that a cheaper design sees everything the current one does?

If not, the saving is a guess and so is the risk.

Where to start

Our Network Visibility Assessment is free. It is a measurement exercise, not a sales call: what each tool receives, what it needs, and what that means for your next renewal. If the five questions were harder to answer than expected, that is where to begin. Request a free Network Visibility Assessment.


Telnet Networks is a Canadian value-added reseller specializing in network visibility, precision timing and network security. We work with several vendors in each of those areas, and our recommendations depend on the network in front of us.

Upcoming Webinar: Show Me the Record: Turning Cyber Controls into Bill C-8 Evidence

C-8 Webinar poster

Bill C-8 (which enacts the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act) became law in June 2026, shifting Canadian critical infrastructure from voluntary security guidelines to strict, enforceable mandates. Under the new rules, designated operators will have just 90 days to establish a documented cybersecurity program and will face a strict 72-hour window to report incidents. For tech and security teams, having cyber controls in place is no longer enough—you now have to actively prove they work.

The Act names six federally regulated services and systems deemed vital to national security or public safety. They include: telecommunications services, interprovincial or international pipelines and power lines, nuclear energy, transportation within federal authority, banking, and clearing and settlement.

Whether you are directly managing critical infrastructure or you’re a tech supplier who will soon see C-8 compliance requirements appearing in customer contracts, understanding how to produce defensible network evidence is now essential.

To help teams navigate these new regulatory expectations, Telnet Networks is hosting a live panel discussion: Show Me the Record: Turning Cyber Controls into Bill C-8 Evidence.

Webinar Details:

  • Date: Thursday, December 3, 2026
  • Time: 1:00 PM ET (10:00 AM PT)
  • Format: 60-minute live panel discussion with audience Q&A (replay available for registrants)

This session is a real discussion, not a series of presentations. Moderated by Telnet Networks President Adrian Norville, the panel brings legal, operator, and network views to the same questions, and they will not always agree. You will hear from our expert panel as they break down what the Act requires and what is still unknown. They will also cover what operators can realistically show in complex OT environments and how to turn network traffic into a record you can present to your board, the Cyber Centre, and your regulator.

About The Panelists

Aaron Shull (Shull Law)

Aaron Shull is principal of Shull Law and a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), where he was previously managing director and general counsel. He advises business and government on cybersecurity, incident response, privacy and AI governance, and has testified before House of Commons and Senate committees.

Dean Parsons (ICS Defense Force, SANS)

Dean Parsons is CEO of ICS Defense Force and a SANS Principal Instructor, with more than 20 years in industrial control systems (ICS) and operational technology (OT) cybersecurity. He advises boards, executives and operations teams on cyber resilience, incident response and defensible architectures across critical infrastructure.

Phil Owens (Stamus Networks, SANS) 

Phil Owens is Vice President, Customer Solutions at Stamus Networks, where he leads systems engineering, support and customer success. He has more than 20 years of experience in IT, networking and cybersecurity as a systems engineer and product manager, with earlier roles at RSA Security, AT&T and IBM, and he served in the United States Air Force.


Whether you lead security at an organization likely to be designated under the Act, manage infrastructure teams tasked with producing network evidence, or handle contracts where C-8 compliance terms will soon appear, this session will give you a practical path forward. Registration takes under a minute, and even if you cannot join live on December 3, everyone who signs up will receive the full recording and session materials afterward. 

Register for the webinar here.

In an OT Network, Something New Is the Alert

Cover of the Stamus technical brief on OT network change detection for SCADA networks

OT network change detection sounds like a compliance checkbox. In practice, it is one of the most precise detection methods a plant, substation, or pumping station has, because those networks are engineered not to change. A remote terminal unit polls the same two masters for years. An HMI talks to one historian. When something new shows up, it is worth an immediate look.

It is also where most security stacks go quiet. Endpoint agents are rarely an option on vendor-managed HMIs or PLCs, and active scanning risks operational disruption. In much of OT, the network is the only place left to watch.

That is the core thesis behind Nothing Should Ever Be New Here, a technical brief from our partner Stamus on behavioural detection for OT, ICS, and SCADA networks.

Download the Stamus OT Security Technical Brief

Why change detection fails in IT and works in OT

Novelty detection has a poor reputation in corporate IT, where constant domain lookups, browser updates, and changing file shares create relentless noise. In a control cell, however, communication patterns stabilize within days. According to Stamus, after roughly a week of learning, the count of genuinely new network artifacts on an OT segment falls to approximately zero.

Against that flat baseline, a new hostname or unfamiliar SSH client stands out instantly. In OT, change control, maintenance windows, and clear cell ownership make every anomaly immediately actionable: the question isn’t whether a new event is malicious, but who authorized it.

Three ways to see change, without touching a controller

This is not an IT tool in an OT costume. Stamus Clear passively decodes industrial protocols down to the transaction level, allowing hunts based on Modbus function codes, DNP3 objects, or MQTT topics rather than simple IP addresses and ports:

IEC 60870-5-104 · Modbus · DNP3 · EtherNet/IP (CIP) · Siemens S7 · BACnet · OPC · MQTT

By analyzing a mirror copy of network traffic from a TAP or SPAN port, Stamus Clear delivers three primary change-detection capabilities:

  • SIGHTINGS record all first-ever-seen IP/MAC addresses, DNS names, TLS/JA4 fingerprints, and filenames across the enterprise; 
  • Outlier Events flag anomalous behaviour tailored to operational shifts (e.g., distinguishing a 10:00 AM program download from an unexpected 3:00 AM modification); and 
  • Host Insights maintains a passive, self-updating asset inventory tracking over 60 attributes per device.

The full technical brief details how these mechanisms map against each phase of an intrusion before an attacker ever touches an industrial protocol.

Why this matters in Canada now

Canadian industrial networks face active targeting. In late 2025, The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security warned of unauthorized tampering with internet-exposed water facility pressure valves, oil and gas tank gauges, and agricultural silos. These incidents relied on valid commands from unauthorized sources—precisely the activity signature matching misses and change detection catches.

Concurrently, regulatory expectations are shifting from basic controls to verifiable proof. As Bill C-8 (the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act) comes into force, it will require designated operators of critical infrastructure to actively detect and report cyber incidents. We have covered what the Act means for operators and for the vendors who serve them. C-8 is new to Canada, but the problem isn’t. Europe’s NIS2 Directive has asked operators for much the same since 2024, and Stamus’ platform offers a battle-tested approach already proven against comparable European regulatory frameworks.

Why Stamus

Built on Suricata, the open-source detection engine, Stamus Clear delivers, passive network visibility into PLCs, HMIs, and legacy devices where agents cannot run. Findings are delivered as actionable Declarations of Compromise with full transaction logs and packet captures attached, allowing analysts to explain alerts clearly to plant managers. With full support for on-premise, air-gapped execution, and seamless SIEM/SOAR export, operational data remains strictly within operator control.

Get the brief

The full 8-page technical brief provides a deeper breakdown of probe placement, network zone definitions, air-gapped deployment strategies, and stage-by-stage intrusion mapping.

Download the Stamus OT Security Technical Brief

Telnet is Stamus’s partner in Canada. You can read more about Stamus Clear on our partner page and in our post introducing the partnership. To discuss passive monitoring architecture for your plant or utility, contact the Telnet team.

Understanding Suricata: The Open-Source Engine Inside Your Security Stack

Blog header for understanding Suricata: network traffic flowing from a TAP into a Suricata engine that outputs alerts, protocol logs and packet capture.

There is a good chance Suricata already runs somewhere in your network, even if nobody on your team has ever typed its name. So what is Suricata, and why does so much of the security industry depend on it?

It sits inside open-source firewalls, behind AWS Network Firewall’s stateful rules, inside free security platforms used by SOCs and classrooms, and at the core of several commercial network detection and response (NDR) products. For an engine that so much of the industry relies on, it gets surprisingly little explanation.

In one sentence: Suricata is an open-source engine that reads network traffic and does three jobs with it. It raises alerts when traffic matches known threats (intrusion detection, or IDS), it can block that traffic when placed inline (intrusion prevention, or IPS), and it writes a detailed, structured record of what happened on the network whether anything matched or not (network security monitoring, or NSM). It is owned by a non-profit, the Open Information Security Foundation (OISF), and released under the GPL.

This post is for technologists who are new to Suricata and the tools built on it. We’ll cover where it came from, what sets it apart, what it is not, who uses it, and why we think it is well placed to remain a foundational security technology. We’ll also cover the part most explainers skip: Suricata is only as good as the traffic you feed it.

Where Suricata came from

In 2009, Snort had been the default open-source IDS for about a decade. It was capable, widely deployed and, by then, owned by a commercial company. It was also built around a single processing thread at a time when multi-core servers and 10 Gbps links were becoming normal.

The OISF was set up to build a next-generation alternative. Its early funding came from the US Department of Homeland Security’s science and technology directorate and the US Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, alongside a group of private security companies; OISF’s then-president put the initial DHS funding at roughly US$1 million. Two design choices stood out from the start. Suricata would read the same rule language as Snort, so existing rulesets would carry over, and it would be multi-threaded from day one.

Suricata 1.0 shipped in July 2010 under the GPLv2. Not everyone welcomed it: Snort’s creator publicly dismissed it as a taxpayer-funded imitation, and the early coverage framed it as a contest between the two. Snort remains under active development at Cisco, and the two engines still share a rule heritage, but their rulesets have since diverged (Snort’s compiled shared-object rules, for example, don’t load in Suricata). More importantly, Suricata went in directions an IDS of that era was never expected to go.

Over time the funding model shifted from government grants to an industry consortium. Today OISF’s Platinum members are AWS and Proofpoint, and its Gold members include France’s national cyber security agency (ANSSI), Arista, Corelight, Cylera, ENEA, Juniper, NEOX Networks, Red Piranha and Verizon. Consortium members receive a non-GPL licence to the engine, which is one reason Suricata turns up inside so many commercial products. Development itself remains a community effort.

Timeline of major Suricata releases from 1.0 in 2010 to 8 in 2025: port-independent protocol detection, file extraction and TLS analysis, EVE JSON output, xbits, Rust parsers, SMB support, datasets, HTTP/2, the now end-of-life version 7, and firewall mode in version 8.

As of this writing the current release is Suricata 8.0.7, from September 2026. Suricata 7, released in 2023, has reached end of life.

Two recent milestones have a Canadian thread. Moving Suricata’s HTTP parser (LibHTP) to Rust, one of the headline changes in version 8, was credited by OISF as a joint effort between Philippe Antoine of the Suricata team and Todd Mortimer of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. And SuriCon, the project’s annual conference, came to Montréal in November 2025, the year OISF marked its fifteenth anniversary.

What Suricata actually does

Three jobs, one engine.

Detection (IDS). Suricata compares traffic against rules. A rule describes something to look for and what to do when it’s found. Here’s a simple one:

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"Example: PowerShell user agent in outbound HTTP"; flow:established,to_server; http.user_agent; content:"PowerShell"; nocase; classtype:policy-violation; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Read left to right: alert on HTTP traffic going from inside the network to outside, on an established connection heading to the server, where the User-Agent header contains “PowerShell”. Notice what the rule doesn’t have to do. It doesn’t say which port HTTP is on, and it doesn’t parse HTTP itself. Suricata has already identified the protocol and split it into fields; the rule just asks for the field it cares about.

Most organizations don’t write most of their rules. Proofpoint’s Emerging Threats team publishes ET Open, a free, BSD-licensed ruleset, and ET Pro, a commercial one. Other publishers, from abuse.ch to Secureworks to Stamus, ship rulesets that plug into Suricata’s own update tool, suricata-update.

Prevention (IPS). Placed inline, Suricata can drop traffic instead of only reporting it. Suricata 8 adds an experimental firewall mode: a default-deny policy in which the ruleset defines what is allowed through, written in the same rule language.

Monitoring (NSM). This is the job newcomers tend to underestimate. Even when no rule fires, Suricata can log every DNS query and answer, every TLS handshake, every HTTP transaction, SMB file operations, flow records, extracted files and full packet capture. All of it comes out in one JSON format, called EVE. That record exists whether or not anything was malicious. Months later, when someone asks whether any host talked to a particular domain in June, the answer is in the records, not in an alert that never fired.

What sets Suricata apart

It identifies protocols by their content, not their port. From its first release, Suricata looked at the opening bytes of each conversation to work out what protocol it was. Malware that ran HTTP to a command-and-control server on an unusual high port was still recognized as HTTP, and still matched HTTP rules. It sounds obvious now. In 2010 it meaningfully raised detection rates.

Rules ask for fields, not bytes. Because Suricata parses protocols itself, a rule can ask directly for a TLS server name, a DNS query, an HTTP user agent or an SMB file name. Rules are simpler to write, easier to read and faster to evaluate.

It is built to scale across cores. Multi-threading was the founding design goal. Suricata spreads work across CPU cores and supports high-performance capture methods including AF_PACKET and DPDK on Linux, with Napatech and PF_RING capture available as plugins. Throughput still depends heavily on the ruleset, the traffic mix and the hardware, so be skeptical of any single performance figure quoted without them.

Alerts and records come out of the same engine, in the same schema. Before EVE, an IDS alert was a terse record of addresses, a payload snippet and a rule ID. Suricata attaches protocol context to each alert and writes it in the same JSON as its protocol logs, so an analyst can pivot from an alert to everything else that host did. It also supports Community ID, a common flow hash that lets you join Suricata records with Zeek logs and other tools that use it. EVE drops into Elastic, Splunk, OpenSearch or almost any SIEM without a custom parser.

It speaks a long list of protocols, including industrial ones. Beyond the web and email protocols you’d expect, Suricata parses SMB, Kerberos, LDAP, RDP, SSH, SNMP, SIP and MQTT, plus the industrial protocols Modbus, DNP3 and EtherNet/IP. It computes client fingerprints such as JA3, JA4 and HASSH. That breadth matters at Canadian utilities and transit agencies, where operational technology (OT) networks are exactly the places a security agent will never be installed.

It is moving to memory-safe code. An engine whose job is to parse hostile input all day is itself an attack surface. Since version 4.0, new protocol parsers have been written in Rust, and version 8 moved more of the core across, including the HTTP parser.

Nobody can close it. Suricata belongs to a non-profit, its code is GPL-licensed, and its detection logic is a published, readable language. A vendor can build on Suricata, but no vendor can take it away. And when a Suricata rule fires, you can read exactly why.

Its rule language has become shared vocabulary. ET Open is written for it. AWS Network Firewall accepts stateful rules in Suricata-compatible syntax and passes them to Suricata for processing. A team that learns to read Suricata rules can carry that skill across products and clouds.

What Suricata is not

Being clear about the limits is what makes the strengths credible.

It is an engine, not a product. Suricata has no console, no case management and no long-term storage. On its own it produces a stream of JSON. Somebody has to collect it, store it, search it, tune the rules and decide what matters. That gap is the reason an entire ecosystem exists around it.

Signatures find what someone has already described. Rules and indicator lists catch known techniques and known infrastructure very well. Spotting new behaviour, such as a host that has never used SMB suddenly touching fifty file shares, takes analysis on top of the records: scripting, statistics, machine learning, or an NDR platform’s own detection layer. This is also the honest answer to the common Suricata vs Zeek question. Zeek is a scriptable network analysis framework built around rich logs and custom logic; Suricata is a signature engine that also produces rich logs. They overlap, and plenty of teams run both. Security Onion and Corelight both do.

It cannot read encrypted payloads. Suricata analyzes TLS handshakes, certificates and client fingerprints rather than decrypting traffic. That metadata is valuable, but it is shrinking at the internet edge: with TLS Encrypted Client Hello, even the server name is disappearing from the wire, as we covered in our post on what network tools can still see under ECH. Internal protocols such as SMB, Kerberos and LDAP, where much of an attacker’s lateral movement happens, remain far more visible.

It needs maintaining. Suricata publishes security releases regularly, and 2026 has seen an unusual volume of them. OISF attributes the record number of vulnerability reports behind its September release to the rise of AI-assisted code analysis. That is a sign of a healthy project under scrutiny, but it means anything built on Suricata needs to track upstream releases closely.

It is only as good as what it sees. Dropped packets, one-sided flows and oversubscribed SPAN ports quietly blind it. We come back to this below, because it is where most deployments go wrong.

The ecosystem: what runs on Suricata today

Because Suricata is an engine, most people meet it inside something else. A cross-section:

ToolTypeHow it uses Suricata
Security OnionFree and open platformSuricata generates the platform’s network intrusion detection alerts and can also produce protocol metadata and full packet capture
MalcolmOpen source, from Idaho National Laboratory with CISACombines Suricata alerts with Zeek logs and Arkime packet capture, with an emphasis on industrial control system protocols
OPNsenseOpen-source firewallIts intrusion detection and inline prevention system is based on Suricata (pfSense offers Suricata as an add-on package)
AssemblylineOpen source, from the Canadian Centre for Cyber SecurityThe Cyber Centre’s malware triage platform runs Suricata as one of its analysis services, pulling rulesets automatically
Clear NDR CommunityOpen source, from Stamus NetworksA turnkey Suricata-based NDR distribution, formerly known as SELKS
AWS Network FirewallCloud serviceStateful rule groups are written in Suricata-compatible syntax and processed by Suricata
CorelightCommercial NDRRuns Suricata alongside Zeek on its sensors, with a shared ID that lets analysts pivot from a Suricata alert into Zeek’s logs
Stamus ClearCommercial NDRBuilds a detection, investigation and evidence layer on top of Suricata (more below)
RulesetsFree and commercialProofpoint ET Open and ET Pro, Secureworks, abuse.ch and others publish Suricata rulesets

Underneath that, a long list of networking and security vendors embed Suricata in their own products, often without naming it on the datasheet. That is part of the point. Suricata has become common infrastructure, in the way Linux is common infrastructure.

A closer look: Stamus Networks

We’ll call out one company here, with the disclosure that Telnet is Stamus’s partner in Canada. Stamus was founded in 2014 by Eric Leblond and Peter Manev, both long-standing members of the Suricata development community. Leblond, Stamus’s CTO, has worked on Suricata since 2009 and sits on the OISF board. That makes Stamus less a company that adopted Suricata than one that grew out of it, and it keeps contributing back: the free Suricata Language Server, which brings rule checking and completion into code editors (version 2.0 arrived in March 2026), Suricata rulesets such as its lateral-movement set, and a free book, Suricata for Analysts.

Its commercial platform, Stamus Clear, takes Suricata’s output and turns it into a short list of high-confidence findings, which Stamus calls Declarations of Compromise, each backed by the evidence and detection logic behind it. It runs on-premises, private cloud or fully air-gapped. We introduced the partnership last month and will look at the platform in more depth in an upcoming post. Here, Stamus is a useful example of a broader pattern: the open engine does the inspection, and the commercial layer does triage, correlation and evidence.

Who deploys Suricata

Suricata’s user base is broad, so it is more useful to describe the types of organization than to list logos.

National cyber security agencies. ANSSI contributed Suricata’s original TLS support and is a consortium member. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security contributes code and runs Suricata inside Assemblyline. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) lists Suricata among its free cyber security resources and backs Malcolm.

Cloud and service providers. AWS builds a managed firewall service on Suricata, and AWS and Verizon both fund OISF.

Critical infrastructure and OT operators. Malcolm was built with critical infrastructure in mind, including remote hydroelectric facilities, and Suricata’s industrial protocol parsers matter wherever agents can’t be installed. In Canada, this is the population Bill C-8 is about to ask hard questions of.

Enterprise SOCs and managed security providers. Usually through a commercial NDR, an open platform such as Security Onion, or Suricata’s EVE output feeding a SIEM.

Defence and training. Suricata-based tools are a regular presence in cyber defence exercises. Stamus, for example, says it has been an invited NDR partner in NATO’s live-fire exercises for more than ten consecutive years.

Small organizations, labs and classrooms. Through OPNsense, pfSense and Security Onion, Suricata is often the first IDS people learn on, which builds the talent pool everyone else hires from.

Why Suricata is positioned to lead

Predicting which technologies will matter in five years is a good way to look foolish. Still, several trends favour Suricata, and none of them depend on marketing.

The network is the layer attackers can’t avoid. Endpoints get missed, logs get wiped, and edge devices such as VPN gateways and firewalls have become favourite targets precisely because they rarely run security agents. Every intrusion still has to cross the network. An engine that records what crossed it, in an open and structured form, becomes more valuable as other evidence becomes less reliable.

Regulators want evidence you can explain. Canada’s Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act will bring incident-reporting deadlines for designated operators, and reporting means reconstructing what happened. A Suricata detection is a readable rule matched against recorded traffic, so you can show an auditor why it fired. That is a different proposition from a score produced by a model nobody outside the vendor can inspect.

AI-assisted security operations need trustworthy inputs. Every security vendor is adding AI agents that triage and investigate, and those systems are only as good as the telemetry they reason over. EVE is open, structured, documented and vendor-neutral, which is the kind of input that holds up. Stamus, for one, already exposes its Suricata-derived data to AI tools through the Model Context Protocol. The flip side, which we’ll take up in a later post, is that an AI analyst inherits every blind spot in the data underneath it.

It is becoming a platform, not just a program. Suricata 8 can be embedded as a library, extended with plugins for new protocols and capture methods, and run as an experimental firewall. Detection, prevention and policy enforcement expressed in one inspectable language is a convergence worth watching.

Its governance is built to last. A non-profit owner, a funding base drawn from competing vendors, a published roadmap and a steady release rhythm (roughly one major version every two years) are what make an open-source project safe to build a business on. Suricata has all of them.

None of this is guaranteed. Encryption will keep narrowing what any network sensor can see at the edge, and OISF depends on continued industry funding. But the direction of travel suits an open engine that turns traffic into evidence.

Getting it right: Suricata only sees what you feed it

This is the part we work on every day, and the part most explainers leave out. Suricata reconstructs conversations, and to do that well it needs complete, two-sided, accurately timed traffic. A few principles:

Use TAPs where it matters, not SPAN. Switch mirror ports drop packets under load and can hide errors. For the links that matter, a TAP gives Suricata a complete copy. Our TAPs overview covers the trade-offs.

Keep both directions of every flow together. Suricata tracks each connection’s state and reassembles its streams. If the request and response of one session land on different sensors, or on different worker threads, detection quietly degrades. When a packet broker load-balances traffic across sensors, it has to hash symmetrically so that both directions of a flow arrive at the same place.

Filter before inspection, but don’t slice. A packet broker can strip out traffic that doesn’t need inspecting (backups, storage replication, video) and remove duplicate packets, which lets the same sensor cover far more of the traffic that does. We made the same garbage-in, garbage-out argument years ago, and it still holds. But Suricata needs whole packets, so the packet slicing that suits some performance tools will break its protocol parsing.

Cover east-west, not just the perimeter. Lateral movement happens inside the network, often over SMB, Kerberos and LDAP: exactly the protocols Suricata parses well, and where encryption is less pervasive. A sensor that only watches the internet edge misses most of it.

Watch the drop counters. Suricata reports its own capture and kernel drop statistics. A sensor that drops 5% of packets at peak is a sensor that misses 5% of the evidence exactly when you need it most. Size for peak, not average.

Synchronize the clocks. Every investigation lines Suricata’s records up against firewall, endpoint and identity logs. If the clocks disagree, the timeline falls apart. Our post on precision time and Zero Trust explains why time is a security control in its own right.

Our view is simple: Suricata-based tools and the visibility layer that feeds them shouldn’t be treated as separate decisions. One determines what the other can possibly see.

Five questions to ask any Suricata-based tool

Whether you’re evaluating an open-source platform or a commercial NDR, these questions separate a well-built product from a thin wrapper:

  1. Which Suricata version does it run, and how quickly do you ship upstream security releases? Suricata 7 is end of life. A product still running it no longer receives engine fixes.
  2. Can we read, tune and add our own rules? If the detection logic is hidden, you’ve given up the main advantage of building on Suricata.
  3. Can we get the full EVE data out, into our own SIEM or data lake? Your network records shouldn’t be locked inside one vendor’s console.
  4. How does it report packet drops, and what happens at peak load? Ask for the sensor’s own drop statistics, not a datasheet throughput figure.
  5. What does it add beyond the engine? Correlation, triage, evidence retention, integrations. That’s what you’re paying for, so the answer should be specific.

Where to start

If you’re new to Suricata, the fastest way to understand it is to watch it work on real traffic. Run it against a packet capture in a lab, or install one of the free platforms above, enable ET Open, and spend an afternoon reading the EVE records. The official documentation is thorough, and SuriCon 2026 runs November 18 to 20 in Lisbon for anyone who wants to meet the people building it.

And if you’re working out where Suricata-based detection fits in your environment, or how to build the visibility layer that feeds it, talk to our team. We’ll tell you what we see, including where it doesn’t fit.


Telnet Networks is a Canadian value-added reseller of network visibility, network security, test and measurement, and synchronized time solutions. We are Stamus Networks’ partner in Canada, and we also carry the TAPs and packet brokers that feed security sensors. Suricata is a trademark of the Open Information Security Foundation; other product names are trademarks of their respective owners.

Introducing Stamus Networks: Network Security Built For The Bill C-8 Era

Telnet Networks and Stamus Networks partnership lockup over a network topology motif, announcing Stamus Networks Canada partnership

The ground shifted in June

Bill C-8 received Royal Assent in June. For designated operators in telecommunications, energy, finance, nuclear and transportation, the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA) brings a 90-day clock to stand up a cyber security program once a class of operators is designated, an incident-reporting window capped at 72 hours, and a continuing duty to identify and mitigate supply-chain risk. That last obligation does not stop at the operator’s front door. It flows down to the vendors and integrators who serve them. The telecom provisions are already in force; the CCSPA itself is law and awaits its in-force order.

None of this arrives in a vacuum. Ransomware crews and state-sponsored actors have been attacking Canadian utilities, transit systems and government networks for years. At the same time, the question of where security telemetry lives, and who can compel access to it, has moved from a procurement footnote to a board-level concern. Data sovereignty is now a security requirement, not a preference.

That is the context in which we went looking for a network security partner. We were not looking for just the loudest platform on the floor. We wanted one that turns network activity into answers teams can act on, backs each finding with evidence and disclosed detection logic, and runs in the environments our customers actually operate.

We chose Stamus Networks and its Stamus Clear network security platform.

Meet Stamus Clear

Stamus Networks is the creator of Stamus Clear, a network security platform built on Suricata, the open-source network security engine much of the industry runs on. Stamus Clear turns network traffic into clear, evidence-backed answers about what is happening on the network, so teams can see what the rest of the stack misses and know what to do about it.

Stamus Clear watches the network itself. Endpoints get missed, logs get altered, and nobody is installing an agent on a substation controller or a signalling system. But every attacker has to cross the wire at some point, which makes the network the one layer they cannot avoid touching. Stamus Clear turns that traffic into a short,  list of response-ready cases: what happened, what to do next, and the evidence and reasoning behind it. Clear Detect raises high-confidence Declarations of Compromise and Declarations of Policy Violation rather than handing the team another queue of alerts or a score it has to trust.

That evidence is the point. When an incident happens, the questions come fast. What did the attacker touch? When did it start? What left the building? Can you prove it? A team running Stamus Clear can answer with evidence it can inspect and defend, and show its work to whoever is asking, whether that is the board, an auditor or a regulator.

Deployment is on your terms. Stamus Clear runs on-premise or in hybrid environments, including fully air-gapped deployments, with no dependency on a Stamus cloud. The customer keeps its network data under its own control.

A decade of proof

Stamus has been building on Suricata since 2014, founded by Eric Leblond and Peter Manev, two of the people behind the open-source engine. The team remains at the core of the Suricata project through the OISF. That depth matters: Stamus is not simply integrating the engine; it brings more than a decade of expertise turning network traffic into evidence teams can act on.

The customer list tells the rest of the story. Stamus is trusted by European national banks, EU institutions, government, critical infrastructure and global industrial operators: organizations that get attacked most and can least afford a finding they cannot explain. The team has also supported a decade of NATO cyber defender training. That track record, together with 97% net customer retention, is proof built over years rather than a marketing claim.

What settled it for us, though, was their approach. Stamus is transparent by design: for detections built on defined detection methods, analysts can inspect the detection logic that fired and the traffic evidence behind it; anomaly detections carry the evidence and reasoning behind the finding. Stamus Clear also integrates with the security tools customers already run. When you have to defend a decision to an auditor or a regulator, evidence and logic you can check are a very different proposition from a black-box score you are asked to trust.

From the fibre to the finding

For more than two decades, Telnet has designed and supplied the visibility fabric (network taps, packet brokers and aggregation) that Canadian utilities, telecoms, transit agencies, government departments and industry run. That fabric decides what a security tool can see. NDR is only as good as the traffic it is fed, and we have expertise in building the layer that feeds it.

Together, Telnet and Stamus deliver the complete evidence pipeline, from the fibre to the finding. We scope the traffic access, Stamus Clear turns network activity into prioritized, response-ready cases and evidence, and the whole chain stays in the customer’s custody.

We built this partnership for specific deployment realities: organizations that cannot send telemetry to a vendor cloud; air-gapped, OT and industrial networks where an agent will never be installed; and operators who will need audit-ready records as the CCSPA reporting obligations come into force. If you already run taps and brokers, Stamus Clear can be added to your existing visibility fabric, shortening the path from traffic access to useful, evidence-backed answers.

“Canadian critical infrastructure operators increasingly need control over where security data is processed and the ability to show exactly why a finding was made. Telnet Networks brings the local visibility expertise; Stamus Clear brings evidence-backed network security that can run on-premise or fully air-gapped. Together, we give operators a practical path from network traffic to answers they can act on without depending on a vendor cloud.”
— Mark Firmin, CEO, Stamus Networks

What happens next

Two things you can do today. Book a C-8 Readiness Briefing: 45 minutes with our team on what the Act requires, where the evidence gaps usually sit, and how to prepare for designation. Or ask us about a proof of concept on your existing visibility infrastructure.

Over the coming weeks we will go deeper on the questions this partnership was built to answer: what audit-ready network evidence actually looks like, why control of security data matters, how detection works in an air-gapped environment, and how to get ahead of the supply-chain questionnaires that C-8 will bring.

Welcome, Stamus Networks. We are glad to have you alongside us.

From Vienna to CERN: The European Innovation Behind Modern Network and Timing Infrastructure

Sub-nanosecond timing over Ethernet was not born in a product roadmap. It came out of CERN, where physicists needed the White Rabbit protocol to synchronize instruments across a particle accelerator with a precision that ordinary networking had no reason to attempt. The specification is now folded into IEEE 1588-2019 as the High Accuracy profile, and it has quietly become the reference point that timing vendors across Europe still measure themselves against.

That is a useful way to think about a handful of the vendors in Telnet’s own portfolio. They are not the biggest names in their categories, but they tend to be the ones doing the interesting engineering: a packet broker maker in Vienna, a clockmaker in western France that has been keeping time since before the telephone, a Suricata-based security platform built by open-source developers in Paris. Here is what each of them has been building lately.

Cubro: Precision Engineering With New Backing

Cubro has been designing network packet brokers, TAPs and probes out of Vienna since 2003, and in December 2025 the Swedish industrial group Addtech acquired a majority stake in the company. For a Telnet customer, the practical upshot is stability: Cubro keeps its Vienna engineering team and roadmap, now with a publicly traded parent behind it (Addtech trades on Nasdaq Stockholm).

The product itself keeps moving. Cubro’s Omnia platform runs application-layer classification directly on the packet broker, an architecture the company has been pushing further as encrypted traffic makes payload-based inspection less useful across the industry. It is the same “classify once, distribute everywhere” idea that shows up increasingly in how Telnet evaluates network visibility architecture generally, and Cubro is one of the vendors building toward it in hardware.

Profitap: Forty Years of TAPs, Reshaped for OT

Profitap’s roots go back to 1984 in Strasbourg, France, before the company relocated its headquarters and R&D to Eindhoven, Netherlands. That history matters less than what the team has done recently with it: the IOTA platform extends Profitap’s TAP and packet-broker lineage into portable, high-precision capture kits built for operational technology networks, where nanosecond-level timestamp accuracy in packet capture is often the difference between a diagnosable incident and a guess.

Profitap’s engineering has always leaned toward the physically compact and the field-deployable, and IOTA is the clearest expression of that instinct: fly-away capture kits that a field engineer can carry to a substation or a plant floor rather than a rack that has to be provisioned in advance.

Infosim: A University Spin-out That Stayed Independent

Infosim was founded in 2003 as a spin-out from the University of Würzburg, and more than twenty years later it is still headquartered there, still privately held, and still developing StableNet entirely out of its German R&D team. That kind of continuity is unusual in network management software, where consolidation is the norm.

StableNet’s release cadence has stayed active through that independence. Its unified approach to fault, performance and configuration management remains vendor-agnostic by design, which is a deliberate choice for a company that could have built a walled garden and didn’t.

Timebeat: Timing Software Built on Open Standards

Timebeat is a UK company building PTP and NTP synchronization as software first, hardware second, which is close to the opposite of how most of the timing industry has historically worked. Its stated position on vendor lock-in is blunt: interoperability is the point, not a concession. The Timebeat.app daemon replaces chrony, ntpd and ptp4l on a host, and the company’s grandmaster hardware line extends the same open approach into rack appliances and PCIe timecards.

Timebeat also builds explicitly for interoperability with White Rabbit-based networks, which is the same protocol lineage that opened this post. It is a small detail, but it says something about how connected European timing engineering still is to that original CERN work, even decades and several product categories removed from it.

Bodet: From Mechanical Clockmaking to Network Time

Bodet has been making clocks in Trémentines, France since the 19th century, long enough that the company’s own history predates the electrical grid it now helps synchronize. The relevant point for a network engineer is less the heritage and more what Bodet has done with it: its Netsilon line brings that clockmaking precision into NTP and PTP master clock appliances built for the same digital infrastructure everyone else in this post is building for.

Telnet has deployed Bodet clock systems where functional requirements could not be met by any other vendor and operational requirements were absolute. Performance has always met or exceeded the required standards.

Stamus Networks: Open-source Security Engineering Out of Paris

Stamus Networks was founded in 2014 by Éric Leblond and Peter Manev, both long-time core developers of Suricata, the open-source intrusion detection engine that much of the network security industry builds on in one form or another. Stamus is dual-headquartered in Paris and Indianapolis, but its product engineering and much of its leadership remain rooted in the same open-source security community that produced Suricata in the first place.

Clear NDR, Stamus’s flagship platform, turns that Suricata foundation into a full network detection and response system, and the company has kept contributing back to the open-source project rather than treating it purely as a dependency. That is a meaningfully different posture from most commercial NDR vendors, and it shows in how transparent Clear NDR is about what it is actually doing under the hood.

The Common Thread

None of these companies are chasing the same trend at the same time. Cubro is scaling with new capital behind it. Profitap is pointing forty years of TAP engineering at OT networks. Infosim has stayed independent long enough to keep StableNet vendor-agnostic on principle. Timebeat is building timing software that assumes interoperability rather than lock-in. Bodet is doing to network time what it has done to mechanical clocks for over a century. Stamus is building commercial security on an open-source foundation it still maintains.

What connects them is a certain patience with hard engineering problems, the same patience that turned a CERN physics requirement into an IEEE standard. Telnet works with all six because each one solves a specific, technical problem well, not because of where they happen to be headquartered. But it is worth noticing, occasionally, how much of the interesting work in this industry keeps coming out of the same part of the world.

Want to know where any of these fit into your network? Get in touch with our team and we’ll help you figure out what makes sense.

Encrypted Client Hello Is Here. What Can Your Network Tools Still See?

In March 2026 the IETF published RFC 9849, standardizing TLS Encrypted Client Hello. In plain terms, the part of the TLS handshake that announces which site a client is connecting to can now be encrypted. The Server Name Indication field, which a surprising amount of enterprise security tooling quietly depends on, becomes unreadable to anything watching the wire.

If your organization filters or allowlists by hostname, writes detection rules against destination domains, or produces any report that groups traffic by site, all of that rests on a field with an expiry date.

Before anyone reaches for the fire alarm: this is a planning problem, not an emergency. What follows is what the deployment data actually shows, what breaks when it arrives, what survives, and where we think the work belongs.

How fast is this actually coming?

Slower than the headlines suggest, and that distinction matters more than it might seem.

The client side is largely ready. Chrome, Edge, Firefox and Brave enable ECH by default when encrypted DNS is in use. Safari is the notable exception, exposing no user-facing support, which on its own puts a meaningful ceiling on enterprise exposure.

The server side has barely started. Research published by Corrata in May 2025 put real-world ECH usage at 0.06% of connections, against a theoretical ceiling of roughly 2% given how few servers support it. Fewer than 10% of the top million sites offer ECH; around 3% of the top thousand, and about 1% of the top hundred.

A passive measurement study of a university network carrying roughly 35,000 users, conducted in February 2025, found something instructive. 59% of QUIC flows carried the ECH extension, which sounds substantial until you look closer: only 1.96% of those were valid ECH. The remainder was GREASE, the deliberate padding clients send to keep middleboxes honest. Every valid ECH connection in the study went to Cloudflare.

That is the central constraint. Cloudflare is effectively the only CDN running ECH in production, and not on its free tier. No other major CDN has announced support since the RFC published. There is also a second gate that gets less attention: the ECH configuration is bootstrapped through DNS HTTPS records, specified in the companion RFC 9848, which in practice depends on DNS-over-HTTPS. The same study found only 3.8% of HTTPS DNS queries received a response at all, and most of those lacked the address data needed to act on them.

A realistic horizon for material enterprise impact is two to four years. RFC publication is the unlock, because CDNs and security vendors generally will not ship a protocol still in draft. The signal worth watching is the second and third major CDN announcing support.

There is a wrinkle, though, that makes that timeline less comforting than it first appears. Corrata’s research found roughly 17% of ECH-enabled sites fell into malicious or risky categories, with more than 90% of the phishing they detected riding Cloudflare infrastructure. That figure comes from a security vendor and is worth treating as directional rather than precise. The underlying logic is harder to argue with: if your operation depends on not being identified by the site you connect to, ECH is the first thing you adopt. The mainstream web is years out. The traffic you most want to inspect is already there.

What ECH actually changes

ECH encrypts the ClientHello, including SNI, under the server’s public key. An observer on the path sees a cover domain belonging to the CDN rather than the real destination. Millions of distinct hostnames collapse into a handful of shared names.

This is the successor to Encrypted SNI, which encrypted only the server name field and had known weaknesses. ECH covers the whole handshake message, which is why it closes gaps that ESNI left open, and also why it is more disruptive to anything that was reading those fields.

Worth noting alongside this: QUIC hides the entire ClientHello as a matter of course. Techniques built on observing the TLS handshake do not carry over to QUIC cleanly, so any answer to ECH that only works on TCP covers a shrinking portion of the traffic.

What this breaks

Framed as controls rather than concepts, because that is how the problem arrives:

  • SNI-based allowlisting and category filtering. The most common enterprise compromise, and the most directly affected.
  • Detection rules keyed to destination hostnames. Hostname indicators of compromise remain effective only where ECH is not in play.
  • Endpoint-agent TLS proxying. This one is worth dwelling on. As Kathleen Moriarty sets out at RIPE Labs, an ECH-enabled browser treats interception as an attack, because that is precisely what the protocol was designed to prevent. It does not degrade gracefully; it fails.
  • Reporting and capacity planning that groups by hostname. Less dramatic, more pervasive, and usually discovered late.
  • Any architecture built on “we don’t decrypt, we just read SNI.” A reasonable compromise for years, and one with a limited remaining life.

Why “just decrypt it” is not the answer it used to be

To be fair to decryption: it still has a legitimate place at defined boundaries, and organizations that have invested in it are not wrong. The issue is that its coverage keeps narrowing.

Certificate pinning already puts a growing share of application traffic out of reach. Inline decryption at scale carries real cost, in appliances and in latency. Privacy and regulatory exposure has grown, not shrunk. And ECH specifically defeats the endpoint-agent approach that many organizations adopted as the lighter-weight alternative to inline proxies.

The pattern is consistent: decryption is becoming a targeted tool for specific segments rather than a general strategy. That is a meaningful shift for anyone whose visibility architecture assumed otherwise.

What still survives on the wire

Quite a lot, as it happens. None of it is payload.

Addresses and ports remain visible. So do volume, timing and directionality. Flow and session behaviour is unchanged, and behavioural patterns are often the most durable signal available. Client-side TLS and QUIC fingerprinting still works against the outer handshake, though it is worth being precise about what that gives you: it characterizes the client, not the destination. Connection metadata and certificate information remain available where they are still exposed. DNS is readable where it has not been moved to DoH.

The useful realization is that for most enterprise purposes, payload was never the thing that mattered. Knowing that a host is talking to a command-and-control endpoint on a schedule matters. Reading the contents of that conversation is rarely what generates the detection. This is a point we have made before in a different context, and encryption has only sharpened it.

So what is deep packet inspection now?

This is where the industry’s vocabulary works against clear thinking.

“Deep packet inspection” still carries the connotation it earned in the 2000s: reading payloads, inspecting content, seeing inside the conversation. In an enterprise network in 2026, that describes an increasingly small and specialized activity.

What the term actually describes in current practice is application classification and metadata extraction, using behavioural and statistical signals rather than payload reading. The question it answers is not “what is in this session,” but “what application is this, what is it doing, and does that pattern make sense.”

That is a genuinely different capability, and the naming confusion costs teams good decisions. We see organizations reject classification approaches because they have privacy concerns about DPI as they remember it, and other organizations buy decryption infrastructure to answer questions that classification would have answered without it.

Where that work belongs

If classification is the capability, the architectural question is where to perform it.

The common pattern is to let every tool do its own. The NDR platform classifies. The SIEM ingests and classifies again. Performance monitoring runs its own copy. Each needs a full packet feed, each does overlapping work, and each produces its own vocabulary for the same traffic.

The alternative is to classify once at the visibility layer and distribute structured metadata to the tools that need it. This is not a new idea, and it follows the same logic we set out when looking at where the packet broker market is heading. Encryption strengthens it considerably: classification is getting harder and more specialized, so doing it once, well, in a purpose-built place makes more sense than asking five tools to each do it adequately. It assumes you have solved the layer below it first, which is a separate conversation about TAPs and capture.

This is where Cubro’s Omnia platform is worth a look, and specifically why. Cubro runs classification as an application on the packet broker rather than as another appliance, which addresses the objection that actually kills these projects. Most organizations already need a broker. Adding classification to infrastructure that is already in the rack, already in the change process and already understood by the team is a materially different proposition from introducing a new box. We have looked at the same platform previously from the high-speed 100G and 400G angle.

Output formats matter as much as the classification itself, because compatibility is the first thing a working architect will ask about. Cubro produces IPFIX, IPFIX with DPI enrichment, and a time-window format of their own. Cubro states that its DPI engine identifies layer 7 applications regardless of encryption, using a combination of deep packet inspection and machine learning. That is the vendor’s claim rather than ours, and it is the right thing to test in an evaluation against your own traffic, particularly against ECH and QUIC specifically rather than TLS 1.3 generally.

The economic argument follows from the architecture. Metadata is a small fraction of the traffic it describes, so tools downstream ingest far less than they would from full packet feeds. Where NDR and SIEM licensing scales with volume, that difference shows up directly on an invoice.

A note for Canadian employers

One thing worth flagging, because it tends to surface late.

In Ontario, an employer with 25 or more employees on January 1 must have a written electronic monitoring policy in place before March 1 of that year, describing how and in what circumstances employees are monitored and what the resulting information is used for. Network visibility tooling is not usually deployed with employees in mind, but the question of whether it belongs in that policy is a fair one, and it is easier to answer accurately for a metadata-based architecture than for one built on full decryption.

There is a broader point here. Where Canadian privacy law does reach employee information, the recurring test is proportionality. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner’s workplace privacy guidance asks directly whether there are less invasive means of achieving the same ends at comparable cost and with comparable benefits. An architecture that collects connection facts rather than message content is a more defensible answer to that question. We will cover this properly in a follow-up post.

This is not legal advice, and the policy itself is a conversation for your counsel rather than your network team.

Five questions worth asking

If you want to size your own exposure before it becomes urgent:

  1. Do any of your security or filtering controls key on SNI or destination hostname? Do you know which?
  2. What share of your egress is already QUIC, and can your current tooling classify it?
  3. Where do you decrypt today, and what proportion of total traffic does that actually cover?
  4. If hostnames disappeared from your monitoring tomorrow, which dashboards, reports and detection rules break?
  5. Are you paying to ingest full packet data into tools that only need metadata?

Most organizations cannot answer the second and third from memory, and the answers are usually further from expectations than people assume.

Finding out where you stand

Telnet’s Network Visibility Assessment is a time-boxed engagement that answers those questions against your actual traffic rather than in the abstract. It includes the tooling and the analysis, and the output is a clear picture of what your current architecture sees, what it misses, and what changes as encryption continues to close in.

If the questions above were uncomfortable to read, that is usually a good reason to look.


Telnet Networks is a Canadian value-added reseller specializing in network performance monitoring, test and measurement, and network visibility. We work with Cubro alongside other visibility and security vendors, and our recommendations depend on the network in front of us.

The Second Ring of C-8: What Selling to Critical Infrastructure Now Requires

Concentric rings diagram: designated operators at the centre of Bill C-8, vendors on the second ring

This article is a follow-up to our Bill C-8 overview post


The contract renewal arrives from a customer you’ve served for a decade: a telecom, a bank, a pipeline operator. Your product hasn’t changed. Your service hasn’t changed. But the paper has. It now carries security attestations, audit rights, a 24-hour incident-notification clause, and a new right to terminate for unremediated cyber risk. Nothing about your business triggered this. Your customer’s legal environment did.

Bill C-8, An Act Respecting Cyber Security, received Royal Assent on June 16, 2026. Its centrepiece, the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA), names only “designated operators” in six vital services: telecommunications, interprovincial pipeline and power line systems, nuclear energy, federally regulated transportation, banking, and clearing and settlement. If your company isn’t on that list, the Act never mentions you.

It will still rewrite your contracts. We have a front-row seat to this shift: Telnet Networks has supplied network, security, and timing infrastructure to Canada’s critical sectors for over 25 years, and we serve both the operators C-8 designates and the vendors who sell to them. Here’s why the flow-down is coming, and what to do about it.

Why flow-down is structural, not optional

The CCSPA makes designated operators responsible for risk they don’t directly control. Operators must establish a cybersecurity program that identifies and manages risks “associated with the operator’s supply chain and its use of third-party products and services,” and they must mitigate those risks as soon as they’re identified. This is a continuing duty, not an annual checkbox. Operators must also keep records of every step taken to mitigate supply-chain risk, which means your security posture becomes part of their compliance file.

The enforcement stakes explain what happens next. Administrative monetary penalties run up to $15 million per day for organizations and $1 million per day for individuals, and directors and officers can be personally liable for their organization’s violations. When executives are personally exposed for supplier risk, vendor risk tolerance goes to zero.

Operators can’t outsource the legal obligation. So they’ll do the only thing they can: transfer it contractually. Due diligence questionnaires, security schedules in MSAs, and continuous monitoring of the vendor base aren’t a courtesy anymore. They’re how a regulated operator proves it met its statutory duty.

That’s the second ring of C-8: a much larger population of undesignated companies (technology vendors, MSPs, integrators, SaaS providers, contractors) regulated not by Parliament, but by procurement.

What “C-8 by proxy” looks like in practice

Expect these artifacts to show up in RFPs, renewals, and vendor portals over the next 12–24 months:

  • Security questionnaires with teeth. No longer check-the-box. Answers will be tied to renewal, payment terms, and award decisions, and they’ll be retained as evidence of the operator’s own compliance.
  • Incident-notification clauses that beat the regulator’s clock. Operators must report significant cyber incidents to the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security within a window capped at 72 hours (regulations may set it shorter). An operator can’t report what it doesn’t know, so vendor contracts will require notification of incidents affecting the customer faster than the operator’s own deadline: often 24 hours, sometimes less.
  • Audit and inspection rights. Evidence requests for SOC 2 or ISO 27001 reports, penetration test results, and patch cadence, plus the right to inspect and, in some drafts, the right to direct remediation.
  • Vulnerability disclosure and patching SLAs for products embedded in or connected to critical systems.
  • Termination for cyber cause. If a risk you represent is identified and you don’t mitigate it, the operator’s cleanest legal path is to end the relationship. Expect that right to be explicit.
  • Insurance flow-down. Cyber coverage minimums appearing in MSAs and renewal terms.
  • Supplier-origin scrutiny. The companion amendments to the Telecommunications Act give the government authority to compel action against threats in telecom networks, including restricting suppliers. Expect heightened questions about product provenance, subcontractors, and where data lives.

What “somewhat compliant” actually means for a vendor

You don’t need a full CCSPA cybersecurity program. You need to be answerable. A pragmatic maturity ladder:

Tier 1: Table Stakes. Documented security policy, MFA everywhere, patch management, asset inventory, a named security contact. Without these you’ll struggle to complete a questionnaire honestly.

Tier 2: Contract-Ready. An incident-response plan with defined customer-notification timelines you can actually meet; vendor risk management for your own suppliers; a pre-built evidence pack (certifications, pen-test summaries, standard questionnaire answers).

Tier 3: Differentiated. Alignment to a recognized framework such as the Cyber Centre’s baseline guidance, NIST CSF, or ISO 27001; continuous monitoring; and the ability to support a customer audit without disrupting your operations.

The fourth-party ripple

Your customer’s obligation flows to you; yours flows onward. Because operators must manage supply-chain risk wherever it originates, they’ll increasingly ask about your suppliers: subprocessors, hosting providers, offshore development. Vendors will need their own miniature supply-chain risk program, starting with a current subprocessor list and baseline security requirements flowed into their own vendor contracts. C-8’s reach is recursive.

Turning compliance into a moat

Here’s the reframe worth internalizing: every artifact above is also a sales asset.

The first vendors in a category who can hand procurement a complete evidence pack shorten the security-review cycle from months to days, and win deals against slower competitors. “C-8-ready” is a positioning claim you can substantiate: pre-answered questionnaires, a standard security rider you’ll sign without three rounds of legal, notification commitments you’ve rehearsed. And as designation orders land, expect procurement teams at operators to begin disqualifying vendors on security posture alone. Readiness isn’t just risk management; it’s revenue protection.

A 90-day starter plan

  1. Map your exposure. Inventory which customers are, or will plausibly become, designated operators across the six vital services.
  2. Read your own paper. Review existing contracts for security and notification clauses already in force. Know your current commitments before new ones arrive.
  3. Build the evidence pack before you’re asked. Policies, certifications, test results, standard answers.
  4. Rehearse incident notification. Define who calls whom, and prove you can beat a 24-hour clock. That requires two things most vendors haven’t built: the visibility to detect an incident quickly, and trustworthy timestamps that let you reconstruct exactly when it started.
  5. Push requirements downstream. Identify your own critical suppliers and set baseline expectations now.
  6. Anchor to a framework. Run a gap assessment against the Cyber Centre’s guidance or NIST CSF and prioritize the gaps a customer would flag first.

Where Telnet Networks fits

Telnet Networks has spent over 25 years supplying mission-critical network, security, and precision-time solutions to Canadian enterprises, government, and the very sectors C-8 designates. That puts us on both sides of this story: we help operators meet their obligations, and we help their vendors become the low-risk suppliers those operators need. Four areas matter most for second-ring readiness.

Visibility you can act on. A 24-hour notification commitment is only as good as your ability to detect an incident in the first place. Network TAPs, packet brokers, and bypass switches give your security tools complete, reliable access to traffic, so detection isn’t dependent on luck or SPAN-port leftovers. The same architecture becomes evidence in an audit: it shows a customer exactly how you’d know something happened.

Detection you can demonstrate. Visibility feeds detection, and detection is what the questionnaires will probe. Through our new partnership with Stamus Networks, we deliver Clear NDR: Suricata-based network detection and response that produces transparent, explainable findings rather than black-box verdicts. When a designated operator asks “how would you know you’d been breached, and can you show us?”, an NDR deployment turns that answer from a paragraph of assurances into something you can put on the table.

Time you can prove. When a customer or regulator asks “when did you know?”, the answer lives in your logs, and logs are only as credible as the clocks behind them. Our GNSS and NTP/PTP precision timing platforms keep timestamps synchronized and defensible across your environment, turning an incident timeline from an estimate into a record.

Connections that can’t flow backward. If your service touches a customer’s critical or OT environment, you are the pathway an operator worries about. Data diode TAPs enforce one-way traffic flow in hardware, letting you deliver monitoring and support while physically removing the inbound threat path, which is often the single fastest way to shrink the risk you represent.

If C-8 clauses are starting to appear in your renewals, or you want to get ahead of them, talk to our team about a visibility and readiness assessment.

Sidebar: The C-8 timeline: why vendors feel it first

June 2022: Bill C-26 introduced, Canada’s first attempt at critical cyber systems legislation.

January 2025: C-26 dies on the Order Paper when Parliament is prorogued.

June 2025: Reintroduced as Bill C-8, substantially the same framework.

April 2026: Passes the House of Commons following substantive committee amendments.

June 16, 2026: Royal Assent. Telecommunications Act amendments take effect immediately.

Today: The CCSPA itself is not yet in force. Its obligations begin on dates set by the Governor in Council, and the schedule of designated-operator classes is still empty. Regulations defining incident-reporting thresholds and program details are still to come.

Designation + 90 days: Once designated, operators have 90 days to stand up their cybersecurity program.

Here’s the catch for vendors: procurement moves ahead of the law. Operators know designation is coming and are papering their supply chains now, because remediating hundreds of vendor relationships takes longer than 90 days. The contractual flow-down is arriving before the legal obligations that drive it, which means the vendor deadline is, effectively, already here.

This post discusses commercial and contractual trends, not legal obligations. The CCSPA imposes no direct duties on non-designated companies. It isn’t legal advice; talk to counsel about your specific contracts.

Keysight Network Visibility, Testing and Security: Where Each Piece Fits

Keysight network visibility, TAPs and packet brokers — Telnet Networks vendor spotlight

You can’t secure or troubleshoot traffic you can’t see. That’s an old line, but it has become a harder problem: hybrid cloud, encrypted east-west traffic, high-density AI data centres, and a monitoring toolset that costs more every year to keep fed with the right data.

Keysight Technologies builds most of what solves this. Their network visibility, security and test portfolio — built on the Ixia and NetOptics product lines — covers passive traffic access, intelligent packet distribution, inline failover protection, and pre-deployment threat validation.

Telnet Networks has been designing and deploying these products in Canadian networks for years. This guide is our take on where each piece actually fits: what problem it solves, what it costs you to skip it, and which environments suit it best.

The architecture in four lines

  • Tap it. Network TAPs give you a passive copy of live traffic without touching your production switches.
  • Broker it. Packet brokers filter, deduplicate and decrypt that traffic so each tool receives only what it needs.
  • Protect it. Bypass switches keep the link up when an inline security tool fails or goes down for maintenance.
  • Test it. BreakingPoint and Threat Simulator prove your defences hold up before an adversary finds out for you.
Network visibility architecture: a network TAP feeds a Keysight packet broker that filters and distributes traffic to IDS, DLP and NDR tools; below, a bypass switch monitors an inline IPS or firewall by heartbeat and routes traffic directly link-to-link if the tool fails

The Keysight Visibility and Security Portfolio

1. Network TAPs and Aggregators

If you’re still feeding your monitoring infrastructure entirely from SPAN or mirror ports, you’re likely carrying blind spots you can’t see and adding load to switches that have better things to do. Network TAPs sit passively on the link and hand you a full copy of the traffic instead.

  • Key features: 100% passive traffic capture from 1Gbps to 400Gbps, supporting single-mode, multi-mode and Cisco BiDi fibre. The Flex Tap VHD packs up to 36 taps into 1U. For industrial and outdoor deployments, ruggedized Tough TAPs provide the same passive access in environments that would kill standard hardware.
  • Companion hardware: iLink Aggregators sit behind your TAPs to consolidate multi-link traffic into a smaller number of downstream tool connections — usually the cheapest way to avoid buying tool ports you don’t need.
  • Best aligned for: Provincial and municipal utilities and other ICS/OT operators, where a passive tap is often the only monitoring method an operations group will approve on a control network. Also financial services, healthcare networks, and enterprise data centres where dropped packets aren’t an option.

Our take: the most common thing we find on a first site walk is a monitoring architecture that quietly outgrew its SPAN ports two or three refresh cycles ago. A proper tap plan is usually the least expensive fix on the table, and it’s the one that makes everything downstream work better.

2. Network Packet Brokers and Software-Defined Fabric

Once traffic is tapped, something has to decide where it goes. A packet broker is the traffic controller for your visibility layer — it makes sure each monitoring, forensics and security tool receives the data it needs and nothing it doesn’t.

  • Key features: Built on a hardware-acceleration architecture Keysight describes as zero-packet-loss. The feature stacks layer up: NetStack (aggregation and line-rate filtering), PacketStack (deduplication and header stripping), SecureStack (inline and out-of-band SSL/TLS decryption), and AppStack (Layer 7 application awareness and geographic filtering).
  • Key products: Vision ONE is the standalone platform for a first visibility deployment. Vision Edge 10S (E10S) suits remote offices and smaller data centres where rack space is tight. Vision Edge 400P handles enterprise cores, with 32 ports of 400Gbps processing in a compact form factor.
  • Management overlays: Keysight Vision Orchestrator (KVO) and Ixia Fabric Controller (IFC) Clustering manage distributed multi-hop topologies from a single console, which matters as soon as you have visibility hardware in more than one site.
  • Best aligned for: Telecoms and regional service providers, mid-to-large enterprises, government departments and higher education. If you’re trying to get more out of an expensive tool farm — IDS, DLP, NDR, firewalls — rather than buying more capacity, this is where to start.

Our take: before recommending a Vision platform we’ll usually audit what your existing tools are actually receiving. In most environments a meaningful share of what’s being sent to IDS and DLP is duplicate or irrelevant traffic — capacity you’re already paying for, twice.

3. Bypass Switches (Inline Protection)

Putting a firewall or IPS directly in the traffic path is how you block threats. It’s also how you create a single point of failure. If that device freezes, loses power, or just needs a routine software update, the link goes with it.

Bypass switches solve this by acting as an automatic detour. If the security tool stops responding, the switch routes traffic around it at wire speed and the link stays up.

  • Key features: Fail-safe automated inline protection. The switch monitors connected appliances using configurable “heartbeat” packets and reroutes instantly when one stops answering — so a tool outage doesn’t become a network outage.
  • Topology: Built on the NetOptics legacy, with full support for both active-active and active-passive tool configurations at any scale.
  • Key products: The Keysight iBypass family, including high-density and copper configurations such as iBypass Copper Gen 4, protects critical links without adding latency or configuration overhead.
  • Best aligned for: Hospital networks and regional health authorities, Canadian financial institutions working to OSFI operational-resilience expectations, e-commerce platforms, and any mission-critical infrastructure where downtime maps directly to lost revenue or disrupted patient and customer operations.

Our take: the bypass switch is the least glamorous line item in a visibility design and the one clients thank us for most often. It typically pays for itself the first time an inline tool needs an unscheduled reboot during business hours.

4. Cloud Visibility and Performance Monitoring

When workloads move to public, private or hybrid cloud, most organizations lose the packet-level visibility they relied on for years on-premises. Keysight closes that gap by extending the same visibility intelligence into virtualized and software-defined environments, so your tools keep a single unified view no matter where the workload runs.

  • Key features: Vision Edge OS on open-compute hardware, paired with virtual cloud taps, lets you monitor public, private and hybrid fabrics including AWS and Azure. For workloads that need precise timing, TimeKeeper® provides verifiable clock synchronization.
  • Best aligned for: Organizations partway through a cloud migration who still need on-premises-grade packet visibility, SaaS providers, and any environment with microsecond timing or timestamp-compliance requirements.

A note on data residency: for public sector, healthcare and regulated financial clients, where visibility and telemetry data lives is as much of a design constraint as throughput. Cloud visibility deployments need to account for it from the start, not as a retrofit. Telnet supports Canadian deployments end to end and can help scope an architecture that keeps monitoring data where your policy requires it.

5. Network Test and Security Validation

Visibility is half the job. The other half is knowing how your defences actually behave under pressure — before a real adversary finds out for you.

Plenty of organizations run on baseline configurations and hope for the best, with no evidence of how the security stack performs under load. Keysight’s test portfolio lets you safely generate large-scale application traffic and simulate real attack techniques inside your own environment, so your team can demonstrate the defences work rather than assume they do.

  • Key features: BreakingPoint and BreakingPoint Cloud run application stress tests and simulate real-world attack traffic safely. The SaaS-based Threat Simulator runs continuous Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) against your live environment without disrupting it. Both are fed by Keysight’s Application and Threat Intelligence (ATI) team, which maintains the threat and application definitions.
  • Best aligned for: SecOps and cybersecurity engineering teams, QA and lab environments, and compliance functions that need documented evidence of control effectiveness rather than a configuration screenshot.

Our take: for teams building a validation practice from scratch, we’ll usually suggest starting with a scoped BreakingPoint engagement rather than a full platform purchase. It’s a faster way to find out what you’d actually use.

Quick Reference

Product categoryPrimary focusBest use case
Network TAPsPassive, raw packet captureReplacing overloaded SPAN ports; monitoring OT/ICS links without touching the control network
Packet Brokers (Vision series)Filtering, deduplication, SSL decryption, tool load balancingGetting more out of an existing tool farm; sending targeted traffic to specific appliances
Bypass Switches (iBypass)Inline high availability and tool failoverKeeping critical links up when an inline firewall or IPS fails or needs patching
Test Suite (BreakingPoint / Threat Simulator)Threat simulation and network stress testingProving control effectiveness; testing resilience before production deployment

Where to start

Building a visibility layer that holds up requires the right foundation — and most of the cost of getting it wrong shows up later, in tool licences you didn’t need and blind spots you didn’t know about.

As a Keysight partner, Telnet Networks can help you assess your current topology, design a visibility architecture that fits your environment, and choose the right mix of TAPs, packet brokers and test platforms for the budget you have.

Two ways to start:

  • Not ready to buy anything yet? Ask us for a network visibility assessment. We’ll review your current TAP and SPAN architecture and tell you where the gaps are.
  • Have a specific project in mind? Contact our team to talk to a technical specialist or request a proof-of-concept design built for your environment.

Understanding & Operationalizing Bill C-8 as a Critical Infrastructure Operator

On June 15, 2026, Bill C-8, An Act Respecting Cyber Security, received Royal Assent. After years of consultation, a false start as Bill C-26, and months of committee scrutiny, Canada now has its first mandatory, enforceable cybersecurity law for critical infrastructure.

If you operate in energy, telecom, transportation, or finance, this law will reshape your network operations. Even for smaller, leaner organizations—like a local utility or independent provider—the headlines about ‘$15 million penalties’ can be overwhelming. This post helps you cut through that noise

This post breaks down Bill C-8’s requirements and provides a practical framework to turn these new obligations into an actionable compliance plan.

What Bill C-8 Actually Is

Bill C-8 does two distinct things, and it helps to keep them separate.

Part 1 amends the Telecommunications Act. It makes security an explicit policy objective of Canadian telecom law and gives the federal government new powers to order telecommunications service providers to take specific security actions, up to and including banning equipment from specific suppliers. These amendments took effect immediately on Royal Assent. If you’re a telecom or ISP, the era of voluntary security guidance is over.

Part 2 enacts the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA). This is the centerpiece, and it’s what most critical infrastructure operators need to focus on. The CCSPA creates a regulatory framework requiring “designated operators” to protect their “critical cyber systems,” with mandatory cybersecurity programs, supply-chain risk management, incident reporting, and record-keeping, all backed by audits and significant penalties.

Importantly, the CCSPA comes into force in phases, with the operational details: who exactly is designated, what the reporting windows are, and what programs must contain, set by regulations that are still to come. That phased rollout is your runway. More on that below.

Who Is Covered (and Why You Shouldn’t Tune Out If You’re Small)

The CCSPA applies to six categories of “vital services and vital systems”:

  • Telecommunications services
  • Interprovincial or international pipeline and power line systems
  • Nuclear energy systems
  • Federally regulated transportation systems
  • Banking systems
  • Clearing and settlement systems

Oversight is distributed across six sector regulators, including the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, the Bank of Canada, the Ministers of Industry and Transport, the Canadian Energy Regulator, and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, each with inspection, audit, and compliance-order powers.

Three things smaller operators should understand:

Designation isn’t about size. The classes of designated operators will be set by regulation, and there’s no revenue or headcount floor in the Act. If you own or operate a system whose compromise “could affect the continuity or security of a vital service or vital system,” you can be designated — whether you have a 40-person SOC or a two-person IT team.

The list can grow. The federal government of Canada can add new vital services and new classes of operators over time. Legal observers, including Osler and BLG, expect coverage to expand as the regime matures.

Even the undesignated will feel it. Designated operators must mitigate supply-chain and third-party cyber risk as soon as it’s identified. In practice, that obligation flows downhill: if you sell to, connect with, or provide services to a designated operator, expect security requirements, audit rights, and incident-notification clauses to start showing up in your contracts. Provincially regulated utilities and municipal systems aren’t directly covered, but C-8 is the clear signal of where Canadian regulatory expectations are heading — and frameworks like NERC CIP already reach Canadian electric utilities through provincial regulators.

The Obligations, In Plain Language

Strip away the legal drafting, and the CCSPA asks five things of a designated operator:

1. Know your critical cyber systems and stand up a cybersecurity program fast. Within 90 days of your class being designated, you must establish a cybersecurity program that identifies and manages cyber risks (including supply-chain and third-party risks), protects your critical cyber systems, detects incidents, and minimizes their impact. You must file that program with your regulator, implement it, and review it at least annually.

2. Manage your supply chain. When you identify a supply-chain or third-party risk, you have a duty to mitigate it promptly, and in line with guidance from the Communications Security Establishment. For many operators this is the most demanding requirement, because it forces a level of vendor risk management that few have formalized.

3. Report incidents within 72 hours. Incidents affecting a critical cyber system must be reported to the CSE’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security within a window to be set by regulation, capped at 72 hours, with your sector regulator notified immediately after. The threshold is deliberately broad: incidents that interfere or may interfere with a vital service qualify. You can’t report what you can’t see, and you can’t meet a 72-hour clock with a detection capability that takes weeks to notice an intrusion.

4. Comply with cybersecurity directions. The government can direct operators to take specific protective measures, and those directions may be confidential: you may be legally barred from disclosing they exist.

5. Keep records in Canada. You must maintain records documenting your program, incidents, supply-chain mitigations, and compliance with directions, and be prepared for regulator audits.

The enforcement stakes are real: administrative monetary penalties of up to $15 million per violation (up to $500,000 for individuals), with each day of a continuing violation counting separately, plus criminal offences for serious contraventions. Directors and officers can be personally liable. But here’s the detail that should shape your entire response: the Act provides a due diligence defence. Documented, board-visible, honestly implemented compliance efforts matter. Perfect security is not the standard; demonstrable diligence is.

From Legislation to Operations: A Practical Readiness Roadmap

The gap between “read the Act” and “pass an audit” is where most organizations, especially smaller ones, get stuck. Here’s a sequence we recommend, aligned with the Cyber Centre’s Cross-Sector Cyber Security Readiness Goals — 36 foundational, achievable goals designed precisely for organizations that don’t have enterprise-scale security teams.

Step 1: Establish scope — inventory before anything else. You can’t identify your “critical cyber systems” if you don’t have an accurate, current picture of what’s on your network. Automated network discovery and inventory, the kind provided by platforms like Infosim StableNet, gives you a live map of devices, configurations, and dependencies, and doubles as the documented evidence base your regulator will expect. Determine which systems, if compromised, could affect the continuity of the vital service you deliver. Not everything will be in scope; a defensible scoping exercise keeps your program focused and affordable.

Step 2: Gain visibility into the traffic that matters. As we often say: you cannot secure what you cannot see. Detection and 72-hour reporting both depend on knowing what’s actually happening on your network. Network TAPs and packet brokers from partners like Garland Technology, Cubro, and Profitap deliver a complete, reliable copy of network traffic to your monitoring and security tools. In OT environments — substations, pipelines, plant floors — hardware data diodes let you extract that visibility and feed it safely to detection tools while physically guaranteeing nothing can flow back into the control network. That’s protection and detection from a single architectural decision, and it gives auditors something unambiguous.

Step 3: Build detection and response you can actually run. A lean team doesn’t need a dozen consoles; it needs consolidated, high-signal tooling. This is where network detection and response (NDR) earns its place at the centre of a CCSPA program, and it’s why we’ve partnered with Stamus Networks, whose Clear NDR platform is built on Suricata, the world’s most widely deployed open-source network security engine. 

Fed by the TAP-and-diode visibility fabric from Step 2, Clear NDR combines intrusion detection, network security monitoring, and behavioural anomaly detection in a single system, and distills the noise into high-confidence Declarations of Compromise®: exactly the kind of clear, evidence-backed signal a small team needs when deciding, on a 72-hour clock, whether an event is reportable. Automated alert triage and guided threat hunting mean you don’t need a deep bench of analysts to operate it, and because it’s offered in both a free open-source Community edition and a commercial Enterprise edition, operators can start proving value now and scale as designation approaches. 

Alongside it, AI-driven network forensics and managed endpoint detection and response, including 24/7 MDR for organizations without an around-the-clock SOC, round out the “detect” and “minimize impact” pillars of the mandated program without requiring you to build a security operations centre from scratch.

Step 4: Make your evidence trustworthy with precision time. This one is easy to overlook and painful to retrofit. Incident reports, forensic timelines, and audit records are only as credible as their timestamps. If your logs come from systems whose clocks disagree, reconstructing a 72-hour reportable incident becomes guesswork. Resilient, GNSS-backed network time from partners like Safran ensures every log, packet capture, and alert across IT and OT shares one accurate, traceable clock, a foundational control we’ve written about before in the context of Zero Trust.

Step 5: Validate, document, repeat. Before major changes to critical systems, test and verify that security and performance hold up. Review the program annually as the Act requires, keep your records current, and brief your board regularly; remember, the due diligence defence rewards exactly this discipline. As regulations arrive and your designation is confirmed, you’ll be adjusting details, not starting over.

The Runway Won’t Last Forever

The phased coming-into-force of the CCSPA is a gift to operators who use it. The 90-day clock for filing a cybersecurity program starts when your class is designated; 90 days is not enough time to build a program from a standing start. The operators who fare best under this regime will be the ones who treated the period between Royal Assent and designation as their build phase, not their waiting phase.

The encouraging news: nothing in the CCSPA asks for exotic technology. Asset inventory, network visibility, detection, incident response, supply-chain hygiene, accurate records: these are fundamentals, well understood and readily deployable, even for organizations without deep in-house security expertise. What most operators lack isn’t capability; it’s a clear, sequenced plan.

That’s where we can help. Telnet Networks has spent more than 25 years helping Canadian utilities, transportation operators, telecoms, government agencies, and industrial companies build secure, visible, well-managed networks. Our engineering team can walk through your environment, map your current posture against the CCSPA’s program requirements, and design a practical, right-sized roadmap to compliance, from visibility architecture to detection tooling to precision time.

Ready to build your Bill C-8 action plan? Contact the Telnet Networks team for a no-obligation consultation.


Further reading: the full text and status of Bill C-8 on LEGISinfo; the Government of Canada’s Royal Assent announcement; legal analyses from Osler, BLG, and McCarthy Tétrault; and the Cyber Centre’s Cyber Security Readiness Goals.